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This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with 
a survey question from the World values survey on whether respondents 
think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we ob-
serve bribery behavior in an experimental bribery game. The research was 
conducted in china and Italy, which have relatively high perceived-corrup-
tion levels, as well as in Japan and the netherlands, which have relatively 
low perceived-corruption levels. In the bribery game, participants have the 
opportunity to bribe another participant to cheat to their advantage. We 
hypothesized that honoring bribing agreements depends on trust, the en-
dorsement of such agreements is independent of trust. We find evidence 
that trust enables bribery in the two low-corruption countries, but no evi-
dence that trust enables bribery in the two high-corruption countries. More 
specifically, trust predicts bribers’ trustworthiness in honoring the bribery 
agreement once they enter into one. The results reveal a dark side of trust: 
It supports socially detrimental cooperation when a deal is unenforceable.
Keywords: bribery; trust; economic experiments; cross-cultural  
experiments
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Cooperating, trusting, and reciprocating behaviors are usually considered pro-
social, in the sense that they benefit society at large. Yet, these same behaviors are 
anything but socially beneficial when they occur in the interactions among crimi-
nals: consider bribery. The briber and the bribee can strike an agreement to coop-
erate: The briber will pay a bribe to receive a benefit, and the bribee will receive a 
compensation for providing some illegal service. However, the bribery agreement 
is nonbinding: the briber may defect on the bribe payment if the illegal service is 
delivered first; likewise, the bribee may defect on the delivery of the illegal service 
if the bribe is offered first. In a sense, bribery is a case of a trust game, in which 
cooperation is difficult to enforce.
When there are frequent interactions among the parties, it is generally assumed 
that trust and cooperation will emerge and stabilize. Individuals who care about 
their reputation as reliable partners have no incentive to cheat in repeated trust 
games or other social dilemmas with no known end point. Criminal interactions 
rely on trust as well. When trust breaks down—perhaps because the temptation to 
defect is too high—and legal enforcement is not an option, criminal organizations 
often seek to restore cooperation through violent means (Skarbek, 2014).
Many illegal interactions occur irregularly and infrequently, which limits the 
effectiveness of reputational concerns and group sanctions. Bribing a policeman, 
an office employee, or a government officer may be one-time events that require 
a high level of reciprocal trust since illegal deals cannot rely on the courts for en-
forcement, that is, these one-time interactions require cooperation and trust be-
tween the parties. Yet, it is exactly in this sphere of illegality that we expect the 
least trust. Who would trust criminals and crooks? It might also be expected that 
people engaged in bribery would display a low level of trust in their fellow per-
petrators, that is, they may be more inclined to think that their fellow offenders 
would take advantage of others whenever they can. 
In this article, we study how self-reported generalized trust can facilitate illegal 
agreements. We focus on bribery, which is essentially the abuse of power in return 
for a material gift. 
TrusT And corrupTIon
There is an extensive literature on trust and corruption, but there is little consensus 
on the relationship between the two. According to some scholars, societies with 
the highest levels of trust are the least corrupt (e.g., Rothstein, 2000).1 In such soci-
eties, trust is a catalyst for socially beneficial cooperation. It has also been argued, 
however, that societies with greater levels of (particularized) trust might exhibit 
greater levels of “both corrupt and donative transfers” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 
1. Among those who claim that high-trust societies are less corrupt, there is some discussion on the 
direction of causation. Some found that low levels of trust drive high levels of corruption (Uslaner, 
1999, 2005). Others found that (perceived) high level of corruption causes people to trust each other 
less (Eek & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein, 2000; Uslaner & Badescu, 2004). Others claim that trust and 
corruption influence each other, so that countries are either blessed with a virtuous circle of high trust 
and low corruption or a vicious circle of low trust and high corruption (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).
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97, quoted by Banuri & Eckel, 2012). If so, trust might be a catalyst for both socially 
beneficial and socially detrimental cooperation.
The discrepancy, according to some, is due to different interpretations of trust, 
namely, as generalized trust, defined as trust in people in general, or as particulari-
zed trust, defined as trust restricted to one’s in-group. Using data from the World 
Values Survey and the World Business Environment Survey, Tonoyan (2005) found 
that the most corrupt countries had low levels of generalized trust, but high levels 
of particularized trust (see also Ensminger, 2001). 
Some authors (Putnam, 1993) claim that there is continuity between particular-
ized and generalized trust. According to this view, individuals who are embedded 
in a thick network of trusting relationships and experience the trustworthiness of 
people around them will have the propensity to extend trust even to strangers. 
In this light, it would be expected that a person who is accustomed to particular-
istic trust will be disposed to generalize and invest resources even when faced 
with anonymous partners. There are, however, many examples of discontinuity 
between particularized and generalized trust, and examples abound of societies 
in which individuals display high levels of trust or reciprocation among family 
members and small networks, but mistrust strangers, institutions, and other ben-
eficiaries of generalized trust. 
Yamagishi (2001) made an important distinction between trust and assurance 
that partly captures the above discontinuity. People within committed relations 
or stable groups feel safe with insiders because formal and informal sanctions (in-
cluding ostracism) against a betrayer are strong enough. Assurance is precisely an 
expectation of trustworthiness of others based on an assessment of their interests 
and incentives. Assurance does not generalize to interactions or situations that are 
not “guaranteed” by existing incentive structures. Trust, by contrast, is meaning-
ful only in situations of great social uncertainty, in which there are incentives to 
act dishonestly and the consequences of being the target of dishonesty are costly. 
Trust, in Yamagishi’s view, is independent of an assessment of trustworthiness and 
is, rather, a generalized expectation about human benevolence.
We agree with Yamagishi in linking trust with social uncertainty. We take trust 
to be the willingness of a trustor “to make oneself vulnerable” to the actions of a 
trustee because the trustor believes that most people are trustworthy. The trustor 
makes himself vulnerable by entering a situation in which the trustee can harm 
him. In turn, the trustee is trustworthy if she “voluntarily refrains from taking 
advantage of the trustor’s vulnerability” (Bohnet, 2008). Trust thus matters in situ-
ations in which it may be advantageous to make oneself vulnerable to another, but 
only if that other does not take advantage of one’s vulnerability. Such trust situa-
tions are nicely captured by the trust game developed by experimental economists 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988). As argued earlier, 
trust is important to bribery because people need to trust that the bribery agree-
ment will be honored—as it cannot be enforced by courts—and they need to trust 
that the agreement will remain secret. Consistent with this view, Lambsdorf (2002) 
found that greater trust on the potential bribees’ honoring the bribery agreements 
predicts higher corruption levels.
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ThE prESEnT STudy 
In this article, we report some specific results on trust and corruption from a larger 
experiment (Jiang, 2015a, 2015b). The larger experiment was designed to examine 
how social preferences and culture predict cheating in different corruption con-
texts ranging from embezzlement to bribery. Jiang (2015a) mainly reports results 
on how social preferences predict cheating in embezzlement contexts, whereas 
Jiang (2015b) mainly reports results on how social preferences predict behavior in 
bribery contexts. In this article, we report results on how trust predicts behavior 
in bribery contexts as we believe that it is a meaningful investigation to show that 
trust affects behavior in this game above and beyond social preferences. 
We do not elicit trust behaviorally. We measure trust with the following question 
from the World Values Survey: “Do you think most people would try to take ad-
vantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” Although more 
elaborate measurement tools for trust have been developed (e.g., Couch, Adams, 
& Jones, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and trust at-
titudes elicited by surveys might predict trusting behavior only weakly (Glaeser, 
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000), we have opted for the simple self-report 
measure for practical reasons. Strictly speaking, the World Value Survey question 
elicits a diffuse expectation of others’ trustworthiness, different from history-based 
trust founded on previous interactions. Measured this way, trust is best under-
stood as an enduring attitude or a personality trait (Rotter, 1967, 1971; Stack, 1978). 
Moreover, though a belief in trustworthiness is not equivalent to trust, we know 
that trustworthiness beliefs are the best predictors of trusting behavior (Ashraf, 
Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006). Hence, we will just talk about people’s trust.2   
In the experiment, participants played the “dice bribery game” introduced by 
Jiang (2015b), in which pairs of participants could chat online and enter bribery 
agreements. The briber would promise to transfer money to the bribee, and the 
bribee would promise to cheat to benefit the briber. However, after entering a brib-
ery agreement, each party could secretly renege on his or her promise. In other 
words, all players had an incentive to renege on their promise. 
The dice bribery game resembles Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner’s (2000) moon-
lighting game, in the treatment with the nonbinding contract. The moonlighting 
game simulates the contracting of unreported labor (“moonlighting”) based on 
a trust game. In this game, the trustee can propose a nonbinding contract to the 
trustor before playing the trust game. The dice bribery game differs from the non-
binding contract moonlighting game in several important aspects. First, both play-
ers can initiate agreements in the more natural environment of chats. Second, the 
possibility of entering agreements is not made explicit in the instructions but has 
2. Note also that our trust question asks whether respondents think “most people” would take 
advantage of them, which seems to refer to people in general, so that the question seems to elicit 
generalized trust. However, since the trust question is not explicitly about people “in general,” it is 
possible that some respondents interpret it as a question about particularized trust. In the conclusion, 
we make some suggestions on differentiating between generalized and particularized trust in 
studying the impact of trust on corruption.
cAn TruST fAcIlITATE BrIBEry? 487
to be discovered. Finally, the rules of the game do not allow cheating, while in 
the moonlighting game moonlighting is allowed. To simulate that cheating is bad, 
Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) designed a bribery game with negative 
outcomes for bribery and the possibility that colluders get sanctioned. However, 
bribing and cheating are still explicitly described as legitimate game options and 
neutrally framed, and so is sanctioning.3 For these reasons, our dice bribery game 
provides a more natural and realistic simulation of the rule-breaking and power 
abuse aspect of bribery.
Our main hypothesis is that the honoring of bribing agreements depends on 
trust, but that the endorsement of such agreements does not. We hypothesize that 
individuals with high levels of trust will tend to honor bribery agreements. A per-
son who believes that strangers are generally trustworthy is also likely to believe 
that, once one enters an agreement the agreement will be kept. The fact that the 
agreement is “illegal” should not matter to the promise keeper. What matters is 
that he made a promise. Even in situations where bribery agreements are not en-
forceable, that is, when, defectors cannot be punished, failing to deliver on the 
promise made in a bribery agreement can incur psychological costs. Most people 
are, for example, generally averse to breaking promises (Vanberg, 2008). Once a 
bribery agreement has been reached, the norm of promise keeping demands that 
the agreement be honored (Bicchieri, 2002). Our conjecture that trust plays a role in 
boosting the likelihood of promise keeping is also related to Jiang’s (2015b) finding 
that pro-social bribers tend to keep their promises.
We further examine whether the correlation between trust and corruption var-
ies with the country’s perceived corruption level. More specifically, we suspect 
that the correlation between trust and honoring bribery may be lower in countries 
in which corruption is socially accepted or even expected (Bicchieri, 2006, 2015). 
As a result, the social norm of promise keeping may be a stronger predictor than 
the individual personality trait of trust, as the threat of betrayal is less likely to 
be present. The experiment was conducted in four countries from two different 
continents, Asia and Europe. In each continent, one country has a low score on the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)4 (China: 3.6; Italy: 3.9), whereas the other has a 
high score (Japan: 8; The Netherlands: 8.9). 
All in all, we conjecture that trust increases the likelihood that a promise will be 
kept. The more one expects others to honor their promises, the more psychological 
cost one would suffer when breaking the agreement. A high-trust person will thus 
be more trustworthy, even if the transaction is illegal. On the other hand, if one 
does not trust that the partner will honor the promise, one could find a legitimate 
3. Barr and Serra (2010) opt for non-neutral framing, while still describing bribing and cheating 
as valid game options. This is an excerpt from their instructions: “The game proceeds as follows. 
First, every Private Citizen can offer a bribe to the Public Official with whom he/she is playing.” In 
our bribing game, by contrast, the possibility of bribing and cheating needs to be discovered. This 
probably feels more natural to participants.
4. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how uncorrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be by analysts, businessmen, and experts (http://cpi.transparency.org/
cpi2011/results/). It is a composite index combining surveys and assessments of corruption collected 
by different institutions that met the criteria set by Transparency International.
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excuse for not honoring the agreement. The role of trust, in this sense, is a catalyst 
for cooperation, even if the result of this cooperation is socially harmful. Finally, 
we predict that the perceived corruption level of participants’ country of origin 
will moderate the correlation between trust and carrying out a bribery agreement.
mEThod
pArTIcIpAnTs
For this study, a total of 216 students participated in experiments that were con-
ducted between October 2010 and July 2011 in four countries. Data of 16 partici-
pants were excluded from analysis due to missing observations on the trust mea-
sure. See Table 1 or the demographic data and the experimental field sites in which 
the data were collected in each country. 
ThE brIbEry GAME
The dice bribery game (Jiang, 2015b) models the essence of bribery by allowing the 
bribee to cheat and give the briber the requested benefits. This paradigm differs 
from the traditional bribery paradigms in the following way. Instead of being giv-
en an explicit option to bribe and be bribed in a modified trust game, participants 
themselves need to self-discover the loopholes of the rules when freely negotiating 
via an online chat the exchange of a side payment and the cheating service. The 
game consists of two stages: a bribing stage, in which the briber has the opportuni-
ty to bribe the bribee, and a cheating stage, in which the bribee has the opportunity 
to cheat to the advantage of the briber (see Figure 2). We first discuss the cheating 
stage, since it will help to understand the function of the preceding bribing stage.
Cheating Stage. Participants pair up with one player randomly assigned as the 
“Scorer” (the bribee) and the other the “Thrower” (the briber). Scorer earns a fixed 
amount of 50 points. Thrower’s payoff depends on the outcome of the dice game. 
The dice game is repeated for 15 rounds and each round proceeds as follows: First, 
Scorer secretly chooses which side of the die will count for Thrower’s payoff: the 
side facing up or the side facing down. The die is a normal 6-sided die, with the 
number of pips of opposite sides always adding up to 7. If 1 is up, down is 6; if 2 
is up, down is 5; etc. (see Table 2 for a summary of the points earned by Thrower, 
given that Scorer chooses either up or down). The Scorer makes his choice in his 
mind and does not write it down or tell anybody at this moment. 
Second, after Scorer has confirmed having secretly chosen a side (up or down), 
Thrower throws a die (on the computer screen). As the final step, Scorer indicates 
on the screen which side he or she chose in the first step. Scorer can do this truth-
fully or not, and there is no way for anybody to find this out with certainty. What-
ever Scorer reports, the payoff of Thrower for that round is calculated accordingly, 
and Thrower immediately sees his or her payoff for that round. In sum, the three 
steps of the dice game are: 
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(1) Scorer secretly chooses a side;
(2) Thrower throws a die;
(3) Scorer reports which side he or she chose in Step 1.
For instance, if Scorer chooses down in Step 1, Thrower throws 4 in Step 2 and 
Scorer reports “down” in Step 3, then Thrower earns 3 points (= 7 – 4). Note that if 
Scorer would report “up” in Step 3, then Thrower would earn 4 points. This is ex-
actly how Scorer can cheat for Thrower—by reporting the side that gives the high-
er payoff, even if it was not chosen in Step 1. Because Scorer can cheat, Thrower 
might want to bribe Scorer in the preceding bribery stage, which we discuss below.
Bribing Stage. As in Jiang (2015b), before the cheating stage in which the dice 
game is played, each matched pair can negotiate a one-shot transfer of a side 
payment X in a virtual chat. Since Thrower earns on average 52.5 points (3.5×15 
rounds) without the help of cheating and Scorer earns 50 points, there is not much 
reason for participants to transfer money, unless they have cheating in mind. If 
anything, 1.25 points could be transferred from Thrower to Scorer out of an equal-
ity concern (or 1 or 2 points, since only integers were allowed). On the other hand, 
the small difference should suffice for those who are interested in bribes to legiti-
mately negotiate a transfer. It is clear why Thrower might want to bribe Scorer. If 
Scorer always cheats to Thrower’s advantage, the latter’s expected payoff rises 
from 52.5 to 75 points (15×5 average expected points per round). The time limit 
for the discussion is 5 minutes. Both players submit their “report” on the transfer 
X in private; that is, the Scorer reports an amount X(S) and the Thrower reports 
an amount X(T). This is done through an input box located below the chat win-
dow within the allotted five-minute chat. If Scorer and Thrower report the same 
amount, i.e., X(S) = X(T) = X, then X will be implemented for the final payment (if 
X is positive, the transfer goes to Scorer; if X is negative, it goes to Thrower). Oth-
erwise nothing is transferred. Note that the bribing stage occurs only once, before 
the 15 rounds of play (Jiang, 2015b).
The amounts agreed upon cannot be revised after submission. As soon as both 
Scorer and Thrower have submitted their amounts, the dice game starts. But nei-
ther Scorer nor Thrower is informed about the amount submitted by the other. 
Hence, neither player knows whether the agreed-upon transfer (if there is one) 
will indeed be implemented so that the briber can take advantage of the bribee by 
entering a smaller amount. After five minutes have passed, Thrower and Scorer 
move to the cheating stage and play the 15 rounds of the dice game described 
above (see Figure 1).
TABlE 2. payoffs
 
 
 
up 1 2 3    4      5        6
down 6 5 4    3      2        1
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Features of the Bribery Game. Throwers (or Scorers) were not told that they can—
or have to—bribe Scorers, and Scorers were not told they can ask Throwers for 
bribes. They were not told to play a “bribery game.” The game was described 
in neutral terms as a two-persons dice game, with the possibility of a 5-minute 
chat for negotiating a transfer X. However, most participants understand very well 
what can be done, as best illustrated in a quote by a Scorer: “…unless X is 20 it 
would not be interesting for me to cheat for you.” 
Thrower and Scorer might come to a bribery agreement, namely an agree-
ment that Thrower will transfer points to Scorer in return for Scorer subsequently 
picking advantageous sides. However, neither Thrower’s agreement to transfer 
points—that is, to bribe—nor Scorer’s agreement to report sides in a biased way—
that is, to cheat—can be enforced: It is merely cheap talk. The players can defect on 
their promises without any chance of getting punished. When deciding to honor 
the agreement, they must trust that the other will do so as well. This makes the 
bribery game a game of mutual trust. 
Since both parties see the earning points of Thrower after each round, Thrower 
can tell to a certain extent whether Scorer honored the agreement. However, Scorer 
instead can never know whether Thrower honored his side of the agreement. This 
is because Thrower enters the transfer amount privately and Scorer does not get 
any feedback on how much was ultimately transferred. Even when Scorer receives 
payment at the end of the experiment, it is impossible for him to fi nd out how 
likely it is that Thrower inputted the agreed amount. Participants know this. 
MEAsurEs dErIvEd froM ThE brIbEry GAME
The bribery game provides us with a rich set of measures regarding bribery be-
havior (see Jiang, 2015b). More specifi cally, we observe (1) whether participants 
fIGurE 1. diagram of the bribery game. The dashed arrows in the chat indicate that any player 
can (privately) input a transfer amount at any time in the 5 minutes allocated to chatting. When 
both players have inputted an amount, they move on to the cheating stage. only if both players 
input the same amount, the transfer will be that inputted amount. otherwise, the transfer is 0. 
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endorse bribery in the chats, (2) whether they subsequently enter a bribery agreement, 
(3) how high the bribe amount is, and (4) whether they ultimately honor the bribery 
agreement.
Bribery Endorsement. A subject is said to endorse bribery if, in the chat at the 
bribing stage, the subject expresses a willingness to enter a bribery agreement, 
which implies that (1) Thrower transfers a positive amount to Scorer, and (2) the 
latter cheats in favor of the former. A subject endorses bribery either by initially 
proposing to enter a bribery agreement, or by accepting or otherwise confirming 
such a proposal by the other. We created a dummy variable of bribery endorse-
ment Bendorse, with Bendorse = 1 if the subject endorses bribery. 
Bribery Agreement and Bribe Amount. A pair of participants is considered to have 
reached a bribery agreement, denoted by the dummy variable Bagree, if both partici-
pants (1) endorse bribery and (2) agree to transfer a strictly positive amount from 
Thrower to Scorer. Note that it is possible that both participants in a pair endorse 
bribery but do not agree on the bribe amount and thus do not reach a bribery 
agreement.
Honoring the Bribery Agreement. A Thrower honors the bribery agreement, that is, 
Honor(T) = 1, when the Thrower enters the transfer amount agreed upon (remem-
ber that this action is fully private). A Scorer, on the other hand, honors the bribery 
agreement when the Scorer actually cheats to the advantage of Thrower, as was 
agreed upon. When both Scorer and Thrower honor the bribery agreement, we say 
the bribery agreement is successfully enforced.
To quantify how much a Scorer has cheated, Jiang (2013) used a measure called 
foresight, namely the proportion of advantageous sides this Scorer picks in 15 
rounds of the dice game. That is, if fj is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
Scorer chose the advantageous side in round j of 15 rounds (and 0 otherwise),
then                     , with 0 ≥ F ≥ 1.      
If Scorer always cheated to the advantage of Thrower, then F = 1. If Scorer did 
not cheat, the expected average of F was 0.5. By chance, however, foresight could 
be much higher (or lower). A binomial test is used to see whether foresight sig-
nificantly deviates from the expected average of 0.5. On that basis, if there was a 
bribery agreement, we say that Scorer has honored cheating (i.e., Honor(S) = 1) if F 
≥ 0.80 (one-sided binomial test, p = 0.02). 
TrusT And chEATInG propEnsITy
Trust. The main explanatory variable of interest was people’s general disposition 
to trust others. We measured trust with a survey question on expectations about 
others taken from the World Values Survey. The question is “Do you think most 
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try 
to be fair?” on a scale from 1 (take advantage) to 10 (are fair). 
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Cheating Propensity. We also included participants’ cheating propensity in as it 
can be a potential confounding factor. More trusting participants might be less 
prone to cheat, and cheating propensity has been found to correlate with bribery 
endorsement and honoring (Jiang, 2015b). Participants’ cheating propensity was 
elicited by the one-player version of the dice game described above. In the one-
player dice game (Jiang, 2013), each player is simultaneously Thrower and Scor-
er. The subject moves through the following three steps: The subject (1) chooses 
which side of the die will count for his or her own payoff, (2) throws a die, and (3) 
reports which side he or she chose in Step 1. The subject thus has the opportunity 
to cheat to his own advantage, rather than to the advantage of another subject, 
like in the cheating stage of the bribery game. The cheating game is repeated for 
20 rounds. The subject earns an amount of points equal to the sum of pips of the 
sides reportedly chosen. 
To quantify a subject’s propensity to cheat in the dice game, we used the same 
measure of foresight F we used to quantify the cheating by Scorers in the bribery 
game. This time 
     , with fj = 1 when the subject chose the advantageous side in round j of 
20 rounds, and 0 ≥ F ≥ 1. We infer that participants probably cheated if F ≥ 0.75 
(one-sided binomial test, p = 0.02). 
procEdurE
The data analyzed in this experiment are taken from a larger experiment (see Jiang, 
2015a, 2015b).5 Participants received instructions and a short test of comprehen-
sion for the cheating game and proceeded with this game (20 rounds), afterwards 
they received instructions and a short comprehension test for the bribery game and 
proceeded with this game (15 rounds). Finally, they answered a trust survey.
Entering and Instructions. To alleviate the experimenter effect, instructions were 
given by audio files pre-recorded by native speakers. Because of the cross-cultural 
nature of the experiments, special precautions were taken. All instructions were 
translated into the native language and back-translated into English by different 
translators. 
Games. In all the games, participants could earn points that were convertible into 
money. The average payment per hour was €10 in both Italy and the Netherlands, 
45 Yuan in China and ¥1000 in Japan. Participants received 15 fen per point in Chi-
na, 4 yen per point in Japan, and 4 eurocent per point in Italy and the Netherlands. 
Note that participants were not told that they were playing “cheating games” and 
“bribery games” or that they could “cheat” and “bribe.” The instructions were 
framed neutrally, and participants had to discover by themselves the possibility of 
cheating and bribing. 
5. Details on the procedure and discussion of other results can be found in Jiang, 2015b.
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Post-Experimental Survey and Payment. At the end of the experiment, participants 
completed a survey in which we asked the World Values Survey question on trust. 
After that, they were paid. 
rESulTS
dEscrIpTIvE rEsulTs: brIbEry, chEATInG propEnsITy And TrusT
There was much evidence for bribing and reciprocal cheating in the bribery game. 
Eighty-seven pairs (out of 100) reached an agreement on a transfer. Seventy-five 
pairs agreed on a positive transfer instead of zero or a negative transfer (which im-
plies that the transfer goes from Thrower to Scorer), among which 53 pairs had an 
explicit bribery agreement (see Jiang, 2015b for the coding of a bribery agreement 
based on the chat data). Among those who reached a bribery agreement, the aver-
age agreed upon “bribe” was 14. The average bribe actually paid was 12, as 11% 
of the Throwers did not honor the agreement and entered a different number than 
the one agreed upon. Most Scorers who agreed on bribery subsequently cheated 
for Throwers, with an average foresight of 0.92. Thirteen percent of these Scorers 
did not honor the agreement: their foresight cannot be inferred to be statistically 
unlikely (F < 0.8, p > 0.02). We report in the Appendix excerpts from players’ chats 
that show the role trust plays in bribery agreements.
As for cheating propensity, a substantial proportion of participants cheated for 
themselves in the individual cheating game. Moreover, in line with the Corrup-
tion Perception Index ranking, the proportion of cheaters was significantly higher 
in the corrupt cluster (China and Italy) than in the clean cluster (Japan and the 
Netherlands; 74% vs. 56%), χ2(1) = 6.636, p = 0.01, n = 200 (see Jiang, 2015a for more 
results on cheating propensity). 
Figure 2 shows the overall distribution of trust (1 means “most people try to take 
advantage of me whenever they can”; 10 means “most people are fair”). Note that 
both the mode and the median were on the lower spectrum of the distribution at 
“3.” We used a median split with the median participants included in “Low Trust” 
to generate a binary variable of relative trust: we classified those who trusted with 
a score of 3 or below as “Low Trust” (n = 116), and those with a score higher than 
3 as “High Trust” (n = 84). 
MAIn rEsulTs: TrusT, brIbEry EndorsEMEnT, And brIbEry 
EnforcEMEnT
Trust and Bribery Endorsement. Since an agreement in the bribery game is cheap 
talk without any monetary cost, we do not expect that more trusting participants 
are more likely to enter a bribery agreement, as less trusting participants might be 
equally likely to enter such an agreement, except for not honoring it afterwards. 
Trust should not play a role in endorsing bribery. 
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As shown by the Fisher’s exact test results at the bottom row in Table 3 there was 
indeed no evidence that high trust participants (both Scorers and Throwers) in our 
sample were signifi cantly more or less likely to endorse bribery (p > 0.1, with ef-
fect sizes being small or negligible). Table 3 columns 1 and 2 show the respective 
proportions of bribery endorsers corresponding to their trust type and their role in 
the bribery game for all participants. This result held for both the corrupt country 
cluster (China and Italy) and the clean country cluster (The Netherlands and Ja-
pan). Columns 3 and 4 show the results only for participants from China and Italy, 
two countries that score high in the Corruption Perception Index. The last two 
columns show the results only for participants from Japan and the Netherlands, 
two countries that score lower in the Corruption Perception Index. 
Trust and Bribery Honoring. Our main hypothesis was that trust facilitates the 
honoring of the bribery agreement. This hypothesis was partially supported. As 
shown in Table 4, columns 1 and 2, high-trust Throwers honored the promise of 
paying the bribe more frequently than did low-trust throwers (Cohen’s d = 0.697, 
p < 0.05), whereas high-trust Scorers did not more frequently honor the promise 
to provide the cheating service (Cohen’s d = 0.152, p > 0.1). The large majority of 
high- and low-trust Scorers honored the agreement in both clean and corrupt clus-
ters. Among Throwers, only low-trust throwers defect on their agreement to pay a 
bribe. Moreover, as shown in columns 4 and column 6, the effect was found only 
in the clean cluster with medium to large effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.857, p < 0.05), 
but not in the corrupt cluster (Cohen’s d = 0.406, p > 0.1).
As a robustness check, we used the continuous trust measure. As shown in Table 
5, the logistic regression results using the discrete variable of trust were robust: 
Trust was not correlated with bribery endorsement for either Scorers or Throwers, 
but it was correlated positively with more bribery honoring by Throwers. 
fIGurE 2. The distribution of trust.
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Consistent with the results shown in Table 4, when we ran the regressions sepa-
rately for the clean and the corrupt country clusters, the positive role that trust 
plays in Throwers’ likelihood of honoring the bribe payment only holds in the 
clean country cluster. 
AddITIonAl rEsulTs: chEATInG propEnsITy And  
ThE JusTIfIAbIlITy of corrupTIon
Trust and Cheating Propensity. Although we found some evidence that trust sup-
ports antisocial cooperation, we have not shown whether in our sample there is 
some supporting evidence that trust is also involved in honest behavior, that is, 
whether high levels of trust (the belief that most people are trustworthy) have 
a negative correlation with cheating for oneself. For that, we ran an additional 
analysis correlating trust and cheating propensity (for private benefit) in the non-
interactive cheating game. 
Based on simple logistic regressions, we found that the correlation between trust 
and the cheating propensity dummy is negligibly negative (r = -0.075, p = 0.218, LR 
χ2 = 1.52, n = 200). There is a miniscule tendency among more trusting participants 
to cheat less for themselves. When we ran the regressions in the high-corruption 
or low-corruption country cluster separately, however, we found a marginally 
significant and negative correlation in the low-corruption cluster (r = -0.158, p = 
0.055, LR χ2 = 3.82, n = 112), but barely any correlation, and if any, a positive one, 
in the high-corruption cluster (r = 0.057, p = 0.594, LR χ2 = 0.29, n = 88). At least 
in the low-corruption cluster, trust seems to have a bright side, as more trusting 
participants tend to cheat less. It could be argued that those who trust people to 
be trustworthy are themselves trustworthy and honest, so they are less inclined to 
cheat for themselves (Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato, 2008). 
Robustness Controlling for Cheating Propensity. Since the propensity to cheat for 
oneself has an effect on endorsing bribery as shown by Jiang (2015b), cheating 
propensity can be a potential confound for trust, although the correlation between 
trust and cheating propensity is weak. Hence we also checked the robustness of 
our main result controlling for cheating propensity. As shown in Table 6 the result 
is robust controlling for cheating propensity.
TABlE 5. logistic regressions with discrete measure of Trust
Bendorse(S) Bendorse(T) Honor(S) Honor(T)
(100 pairs) (53 pairs)
Trust 0.143 (0.15) 0.086 (0.83) -0.027 (-0.20) 0.422** (2.57)
constant 0.566 (1.38) 0.170 (0.41) 1.985*** (2.88) 0.678 (0.91)
log-likelihood -64.73 -65.939 -20.673 -17.355
Wald χ2 (1) 0.02 0.69 0.04 6.59
prob > χ2 0.882 0.408 0.844 0.010
Note. bootstrapped z-scores in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1), with 500 bootstrapped replications.
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Trust, Justifiability of Corruption in WVS, and CPI. It can be argued that more trust-
ing participants in the low-corruption cluster but not in the high-corruption clus-
ter might find corruption less justifiable. To test on this possibility, we ran further 
regressions using the World Value Survey data (2010–2014) on trust and how jus-
tifiable cheating and bribe taking are seen at the individual level in countries with 
varying perceived corruption levels. Respondents were asked to rate the justifi-
ability of the following five behaviors related to cheating and bribery (10: always 
justifiable; 1: never justifiable):
•	Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
•	Avoiding a fare on public transportation
•	Stealing property
•	Cheating on taxes if you have the chance
•	Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
The overall reliability score of the five items was reasonably high (Cronbach’s a = 
0.845) and hence we constructed an overall index of justifiability of cheating and 
bribe taking by taking the mean of all five items. In our samples, the clean cluster 
consists of Japan [the score of Corruption Perception Index (CPI): 8] and the Neth-
erlands (CPI: 8.9), whereas the corrupt cluster consists of China (CPI: 3.6) and Italy 
(CPI: 3.9). Here we first examined whether the correlation between trust and the 
justifiability of corruption is different for countries perceived to be at least as clean 
as Japan and for countries perceived to be at least as corrupt as Italy. It turns out 
that for countries with CPI ≥ 8, the overall correlation was negative and significant, 
though very small, F(1, 10232) = 8.28, r = -0.044, p = 0.004. More trusting partici-
pants found corruption less justifiable. For countries with CPI ≤ 3.9, the correlation 
was also significant, but positive, F(1, 41609) = 97.87, r = 0.081, p < 0.001, that is, 
more trusting participants found corruption more justifiable. 
In light of this additional piece of evidence, we further examined if the correla-
tion between trust and justifiability of corruption was overall more negative for 
the clean countries. We took the significance of the regression coefficient of “Trust” 
and “Overall justifiability” in each country as the dependent variable and the CPI 
TABlE 6. logistic regressions with discrete measure of Trust
Bendorse(S) Bendorse(T) Honor(S) Honor(T)
(100 pairs) (53 pairs)
Trust 0.028 (0.25) 0.086 (0.81) 0.155 (0.61) 0.408** (2.48)
cheating 2.69** (2.15) -0.041 (-0.03) 6.455 (1.20) -1.274 (-0.37)
constant -1.557 (-1.38) 0.204 (0.16) -3.410 (-0.84) 1.765 (0.59)
log-likelihood -61.855 -65.939 -17.740 -17.245
Wald χ2 (1) 4.73 0.67 1.47 6.29
prob > χ2 0.094 0.714 0.142 0.043
Note. bootstrapped z-scores in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1), with 500 bootstrapped replications.
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score of a country as the independent variable. We found that the t-value of the 
coefficient (Mean = 0.553, Standard Deviation = 3.475) was negatively correlated 
with the CPI score, F(1, 52) = 4.70, r = -0.462, p = 0.035. This finding highlights the 
complexity of the relationship between trust and corruption.
dIScuSSIon
The results indicate that the relationship between trust and corruption is more 
complex than the traditional view that high-trust countries are less corrupt (e.g., 
Rothstein, 2000). First, there are different kinds of corruption. For instance, bribery 
is very different from embezzlement. Bribery requires trust, because bribery agree-
ments cannot be legally enforced. In the case of bribery, our experiment shows 
that trust enables corruption since more trusting bribers are more likely to honor 
the bribe payment in the two low-corruption countries. This is the dark side of trust 
(Tonoyan, 2005). In contrast, embezzlement does not require trust, since it involves 
only the embezzler. As a result, trust might play a deterring role in embezzlement 
as more trusting participants tend to cheat less in the two low-corruption coun-
tries, which is the bright side of trust.
Second, trust plays a role only at a specific stage in the bribery transaction. Our 
results show that trust is important when executing the bribery agreement, but 
not when negotiating a potential bribery agreement. In other words, trust matters 
for bribery enforcement, but not for bribery endorsement in situations in which 
endorsement is not costly. Only when executing the agreement, that is, when costs 
are incurred, does the need to trust the other party arise. One will only honor the 
agreement when one trusts that the other will honor the agreement as well and 
will not take advantage of one’s vulnerable position in the shady context of brib-
ery.
A third complication arises when thinking of the different roles in a bribery trans-
action. We have shown that trust only influences whether the briber (the Thrower, 
in our game) honors the agreement: it does not influence the extent to which the 
bribee (the Scorer, in our game) honors the agreement. 
To understand the reasons for the asymmetric effect of trust on the different 
players’ roles, let us consider the different tasks entailed by the two roles: while 
Thrower’s agreed-upon action is to pay Scorer a side payment in return for a cheat-
ing service, Scorer’s agreed-upon action is to cheat for Thrower. In other words, 
Thrower’s action has a monetary cost, since Thrower has to transfer earning points, 
while Scorer’s part of the agreement—cheating in favor of Thrower—does not cost 
Scorer any earning points. Trust might play a much less important role for Scor-
ers, because honoring the agreement has no monetary cost, whereas for Throwers 
trusting that the other will honor the agreement is an important consideration that 
motivates keeping a promise, even at a personal cost. This result is consistent with 
findings in Jiang (2015b) where the effect of pro-sociality on honoring a bribe also 
interacts with the role of the player: while more pro-social Throwers tend to honor 
500 JIAng ET Al.
the bribe payment, more pro-social Scorers are not more or less likely to honor the 
cheating service. 
Finally, our experiment suggests something surprising, namely, that trust mat-
ters in clean countries but we do not find evidence that supports its role in corrupt 
countries. We speculate that in corrupt countries corruption is a descriptive, and 
possibly a social, norm: in such countries most people are corrupt and expect that 
most others are corrupt, too. Hence, trust is much less important in countries with 
widespread corruption than in clean countries, in which it is not obvious that one 
will find a trustworthy partner in crime. 
Here, we offer some speculations on why the effect of trust only plays a role in 
clean countries. In a clean country, corruption is uncommon. Therefore, the ex-
pectation is that people will not cheat easily. A low-trust Thrower may have little 
faith that the Scorer will fulfill the agreement. The low-trust Thrower may think 
that even a Scorer who agreed to be bribed may have second thoughts, or just be 
the type of person who reneges on promises if there is something to be gained. A 
high-trust person, however, might still keep his promises as the psychological cost 
of promise breaking is too high. If, however, corruption is the descriptive norm in 
a country or society, it is common to enter and honor bribery agreements, and trust 
may play a much lesser role. 
The low correlation at the individual level between trust and personal cheating 
in the two more corrupt countries is consistent with the result that there is little 
correlation between trust and bribery in the high-corruption cluster. One potential 
explanation for this finding is that when corruption is socially accepted or even 
expected (Bicchieri, 2006, 2015), individuals may engage in it without feeling that 
their behavior is socially detrimental. In such a context, even high-trust people 
may be likely to engage in corruption. In a clean society, however, corruption is 
infrequent and socially condemned. In such a society, engaging in corruption is 
more likely to be a personal, somewhat deviant choice, as it is not a socially ex-
pected or condoned behavior. 
There are several caveats we need note. First, we investigated the specific case, in 
which the benefit to the briber is at least as large as the cost to experimenter: brib-
ing therefore is not inefficient, though the psychological cost of the abuse of power 
may still remain. Thus, our result might not generalize to situations in which the 
social harm produced by cheating is more salient. For future research, one might 
consider making the social harm significant instead of merely hurting the experi-
menter, so that the bribery deal is socially inefficient in a salient and costly way. 
Second, Scorer’s honoring of the cheating service is only psychologically cost-
ly, if any, but not monetarily. Future research could examine whether the results 
would hold if honoring cheating becomes payoff-wise costly, by incorporating the 
risk of being punished when cheating is discovered. 
Third, in the bribery game, trusting and trustworthiness are not clearly sepa-
rated. Thrower’s untrustworthy defection on Scorer, or the other way around, 
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could result from lack of trust on the other’s trustworthiness. Thus, the success of 
a bribery deal—the pair reaching a bribery agreement that is honored by both par-
ties—crucially depends on the mutual trust. Depending on the research questions, 
future research can also utilize a sequential variant of the game with symmetric 
information so that the bribee is informed about the bribe amount paid before he 
plays the cheating game, to resemble more a real life bribery situation. 
Finally, although attitudinal trust has been found to predict behavioral trust-
worthiness in a trust game (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), one promising direction 
would be to correlate behavioral trustworthiness and the propensity to honor a 
bribery agreement. Moreover, multi-item trust measures (e.g., Couch, Adams, & 
Jones, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) might give more 
robust results than the single-item measure we used.
conclusIon
This study sheds some light on the complex relationship between trust and cor-
ruption. The role trust plays in corruption can potentially have both a bright and 
a dark side. Our results shed light on the negative role trust plays in facilitating 
bribery agreements that are difficult to enforce. Moreover, the bribery game we 
used (see Jiang, 2015b) provides a tool to study this complex relationship. Our 
study cannot offer final answers to the puzzle of trust and corruption: it can only 
indicate in which directions we should go. 
Here are some questions that merit an answer: What is the impact of particu-
larized trust versus generalized trust on bribery behavior? How do expectations 
about the other party honoring his or her part of the agreement matter? What is 
the relationship between trust and expectations, and how do they interact and 
drive the dynamics of bribery over time? These are important questions that in-
volve large-scale sociopolitical phenomena that affect the welfare of many people. 
We believe future experiments can take further steps to answer some of these cru-
cial questions.
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AppEndIx
To shed light on the dynamics of bribery negotiation and illustrate some of the thinking of 
corrupt participants in the lab setting, we cite some excerpts from the chats in the bribing 
stage. The content of these chats shows that many participants were well aware of the pos-
sibility of bribing, and provides some evidence about the role of trust in the bribery game. 
First, there is evidence from the chat data that participants perceive the bribery game as a 
bribery situation. Here is an example from Jiang (2015b) that shows that some participants 
explicitly express their aversion to bribery while others claim that it is just “a virtual game.” 
The conversation between the Chinese pair goes as follows: 
Scorer: “Hi. = = Is this [huilu](translation: bribery in Chinese)? Sigh. My heart is 
so very tangled up. Ha, no need to give anything.” 
Thrower: “Yes, you choose the biggest every time and I will give you 13, what 
do you think? Because if you choose the biggest one every time, I can earn 15*3 
= 75. But you can only earn 50. So if I give you 13, then we are even?” 
Scorer: “Are you male?” 
Thrower: “Sorry, it should be 15*5 = 75. Yes, I am male. Then we both do 13.” 
Scorer: “Hey, I don’t like bribe.” 
Thrower: “It is almost time. What can we do then. This is just a virtual game. It 
is an economic decision, not political bribery.”
Now let us look at a Japanese conversation. Although Japanese conversations tend to be 
very short, the dynamics of the bribery negotiation is clearly exposed, even within a few 
sentences. For instance, a Japanese Scorer says that the expected payoff of Thrower would 
be 75 (without explicitly saying if he would cheat) and asks about the transfer. Thrower 
says: “Personally, zero is good.” Scorer agrees in a very nice way. The Thrower then reveals 
his preference for honesty in an implicit way: “Could I ask for a total number about 50?” 
These examples show that some participants do take the game seriously: cheating is not 
good. But a substantial proportion of participants in our experiment did mention cheat-
ing explicitly or implicitly. While in the bribing stage the participants could decide on a 
“transfer,” it was clear that many saw it as an opportunity to offer or solicit bribes in return 
for cheating in the next stage. In the Netherlands, participants even cover up their cheating 
with humor. When a Dutch Thrower, not convinced that his expected payoff would be 75, 
said: “But I don’t always throw that high,” the Scorer answered: “But I always think high.” 
Here is how a Japanese Thrower requests the favor after offering a bribe: “We will need the 
Scorer to have a very keen guess.” 
Another observation from the chat data is that participants were also aware that the trans-
fer relies on trust. In particular, Scorer needs to trust that Thrower does input X as promised. 
A Dutch Scorer said: “I can’t be sure about what you put as X, so I will just have to trust 
you as well…Filling it in now. Filled it in?” Here is another Dutch pair who just agreed to 
input 12.5. Scorer: “Is it working over there?” Thrower: “No. I think you have to fill in whole 
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numbers. So 12 then?” Scorer: “Ha-ha, just checking whether you really filled in 12.5. Smiley. 
Well, because it’s you: 12.”
Some enforcement mechanism like oral blackmailing also emerged as a result of the chal-
lenge on trust. For instance, an Italian Thrower proposes a transfer of zero. Scorer: “Well, 
but then I will punish you, and I write that I had always chosen in mind the side unfavor-
able for you…If we agree something like 20, I will always mark the favorable side for you 
and you will be fine.” Thrower says that a negative transfer is better for him/her but cannot 
convince Scorer. Thrower: “Let’s do 5. 20 is too much.” Scorer: “Let’s do 17: It brings good 
luck. If we get a lot of 1s, I mark the down side and you earn 6.” Thrower: “I don’t believe 
it. I don’t trust it. 10 and we don’t talk more.” Scorer: “15 last offer.” Thrower: “Mmm…
OK.” Result: Thrower indeed transfers 15 and Scorer indeed always picks the good sides. 
It is also interesting to see that Italians negotiate a lot but do not revolt against being black-
mailed and do not punish blackmailers—suggesting that they might see it as a legitimate 
bargaining strategy.
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